Finally, it should be noted that, in these latest bills, the state has an important tendency to look beyond non-competition prohibitions and to restrict or prohibit employment contracts that affect workers` occupational mobility. For example, Maine law, which does not violate competition measures, prohibits not only non-compete contracts, but all “restrictive employment contracts” defined to contain an agreement prohibiting “an employer or preventing the recruitment or hiring of workers from another employer or former employee.”  This measure is an important finding – and should be considered by other policy makers – that contracts that restrict worker mobility are not always explicitly referred to as “anti-competitive” and are not always concluded by an employer and a worker. On the contrary, different clauses in an employment contract can have the effect of a non-compete clause and, in addition, contracts between employers in a large number of contractual relationships (franchisees, subcontractors, other companies in a supply chain) may also affect the mobility of workers. Broader definitions and agreements will effectively repair the damage. It is important to note that most recent reforms at the national level do not prohibit competition, prohibit or provide for sanctions for their use. On the contrary, they make non-competition prohibitions unfeasible, which means that if challenged in court, they would be repressed. That is an important difference. These laws protect or encourage employers who do not compete for low-wage workers, but they also do not create strong incentives to overload employers. However, some states have taken innovative steps to impose certain costs on employers related to the use of the illegal non-competition clause or to encourage them to think more critically about who they can and should be used for. However, employees should be very careful before signing such agreements. Employers often design the language of restriction to a large extent for their own protection.
Employers should also be cautious, as courts do not enforce non-competition prohibitions when they are unserious, insult public order or otherwise act as a trade restriction for the worker. The same power imbalance and lack of legal advice can also characterize employee behaviour at the other end of the employment relationship. An employer can, for example. B, remind a worker who wants to leave the country that he is not competing.  Or you can call it a potential employer during a reference exam. Both may have an informal enforcement effect, since the worker may decide not to leave work or the competitor may decide not to hire him for fear of being sued. As such, as Harlan Blake wrote, “[f] or any alliance that finds its way through the courts, there are thousands of people who have a terrorist effect on employees who meet their contractual obligations and competitors who fear legal complications if they employ an ally, or who are anxious to maintain gentle relationships with their competitors.”  Canadian courts will apply competition and non-appeal agreements, but the agreement must be limited, in time, scope and geographic scope, to what is reasonably necessary to protect the company`s property rights, such as confidential business information or customer relations and the scope of the agreement must be clearly defined. Shafron v.
KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc. 2009 CSC 6 of the Supreme Court of Canada found that a non-competition agreement was inconclusive because the term “Metropolitan City of Vancouver” was not definitively defined.   Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) has introduced several federal laws to restrict or prohibit the use of non-competition prohibitions: mobility and opportunity for vulnerable employees